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ABSTRACT 
All across the country, officials and planners of the first-responder community 
plan for events of various types, yet their plans do not adequately account for crowd 
behavior when the event is interrupted by an act of violence that turns into a 
mass-casualty incident, or a “focus event.” This research contests early crowd 
psychology studies and presents the contemporary social identity theory, elaborated 
social identity model, and emergence model as better lenses for crowd behavior in 
responding to a focus event. Case studies of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the 
2017 Las Vegas mass shooting are used to analyze crowds that experienced focus events 
through the perspective of complex adaptive systems. A new framework that incorporates 
the elements of stress, panic, chaos, and priming is then presented to assist officials and 
planners with planning for crowds experiencing a focus event, with the aim of leveraging 
crowd emergence. The new framework presented in this research leads to a set of 
actionable recommendations for policymakers and planners. Ultimately, this thesis 
challenges officials and planners of the first-responder community to evaluate crowds as 
complex adaptive systems and explore the ability to leverage crowds for a more effective 
response. 
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Crowds that experience a focus event—a mass-casualty incident that arises during 
a pre-planned event—have repeatedly taken on the role of “immediate responders.”1 
However, without an understanding of crowd behavior, officials and emergency response 
planners cannot leverage it for a more effective response. This thesis challenges traditional 
studies of crowd behavior to glean an understanding of crowds’ reactions to focus events.  
For example, the early works of Gustave Le Bon, which have influenced modern-
day planning, leave officials and planners to imagine crowds as mindless mobs. Yet a 
crowd that experiences a focus event more closely resembles a complex adaptive system, 
particularly its non-linear nature. Through the lens of a complex adaptive system, a crowd 
cannot devolve into chaos. Indeed, complex adaptive systems operate at the edge of chaos 
without ever achieving it, the result of living systems’ seeking order—the chaordic.2 
This study employs case study analysis of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and 
the 2017 Las Vegas mass shooting to evaluate both crowds as complex adaptive systems, 
looking for correlating crowd behavior while examining the pre-event response posture 
and initial response by first responders. The research was derived from open sources, 
including after-action reports, journal articles, and formal inquiries; no new interviews 
were conducted. The case studies evaluate the crowd emergence witnessed in Boston and 
Las Vegas, as both supplied needed assistance but also hindered the responding agencies. 
The findings confirm the non-linearity of crowds, their impending emergence, and the need 
to shed old frameworks of crowd behavior that explain crowds as mindless mobs. 
The findings in the case studies chapter led this research to formulate a new 
framework for officials and planners to consider in contingency planning for a focus event. 
The framework comprises stress, panic, chaos, and priming. Research for this thesis and 
1 Amir Khorram-Manesh et al., “Immediate Response to Major Incidents: Defining an Immediate 
Responder!,” European Journal of Trauma and Emergency Surgery 46 (2020): 1310, https://doi.org/10.
1007/s00068-019-01133-1. 
2 Jonathan Sapir, Thriving at the Edge of Chaos: Managing Projects as Complex Adaptive Systems 
(Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2020), 52. 
xvi 
the case studies demonstrate that stress is responsible for fight-or-flight behavior, which 
translates into focus event preparations for officials.3 Moreover, in most focus events, 
stress compels emergent behavior in immediate responders, while panic and mass panic 
are misnomers in the context of crowds experiencing focus events.4 Furthermore, 
communication with the crowd does not incite panic as traditional authoritarian crowd-
management discourse suggests; rather, communication is a positive action that officials 
can employ to acquire credibility with the crowd and to assist responders with their 
response.5  
Chaos in the newly presented framework highlights the non-linearity of crowds 
experiencing a focus event, because as complex adaptive systems, they seek order—
stabilizing the chaordic zone with flexibility to react to the rapidly evolving scene.6 
Planners can leverage the opportunities presented by the crowd within the chaordic zone 
through an understanding of priming, the final element of the framework. Priming means 
that an individual possesses skills to draw from to intervene during a focus event, and 
planners can capitalize on the inevitable emergence of such priming within a crowd. For 
instance, the hemorrhage control skills learned in “Stop the Bleed” training prime an 
individual to apply a tourniquet to an injured crowd member during a focus event. Officials 
responsible for the safety of individuals attending events have an opportunity not only to 
plan for crowd members who are primed to be immediate responders but also to prime their 
local constituents to build general resiliency within their communities. 
This thesis finds that planners who view crowds experiencing a focus event through 
the lens of a complex adaptive system will better understand crowd behavior; thus, officials 
can create a more effective response that leverages the crowd within the first 15 minutes 
3 Robert M. Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2018), 125–26. 
4 John Drury, Group Dynamics: Mass Emergency Behavior (London: SAGE Video Tutorials, 2016), 
video transcript, 3–4. 
5 Chris Cocking and John Drury, “Talking about Hillsborough: ‘Panic’ as Discourse in Survivors’ 
Accounts of the 1989 Football Stadium Disaster,” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 24, 
no. 2 (March/April 2014): 88, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2153. 
6 Sapir, Thriving at the Edge of Chaos, 63. 
xvii 
of the act of violence. Among the actionable recommendations of this research, planners 
should evaluate crowd demographics for upcoming events as a factor in crowd emergence, 
as well as responder distractors caused by individuals within the crowd. Moreover, when 
agencies pre-deploy resources along with a pre-established unified command structure, 
they may more effectively leverage the crowd.  
The current mentality of the first-responder community does not acknowledge the 
opportunity that lies within crowds experiencing a focus event, yet policymakers and 
planners alike can and should account for the inevitability of crowd emergence, made 
manifest in immediate responders. Moreover, future research should reevaluate crowds as 
complex adaptive systems to find new ways to leverage them during focus events. Until 
then, this thesis provides planners with a modernized framework to leverage stress, panic, 
chaos, and priming in a crowd within the first 15 minutes of an emergency response to 
improve the outcome. 
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IN REMEMBRANCE 
As a public servant, I feel responsible for the safety of my family, community, and 
visitors to my home town alike, and it is my honor to serve. While I cannot fully express 
my sympathy to those who were injured or lost their lives in the wicked acts in Boston and 
Las Vegas—or to their families and loved ones—I have tried to pay my respects through 
this research. As such, I dedicate this thesis to the memories of the individuals listed below. 
My hope is that this thesis assists future communities in their efforts to battle the 
wickedness we are charged to protect against. 
Those We Lost in Boston1 
Martin Richard, 8 Krystle Campbell, 29 Lu Lingzi, 23 
Those We Lost in Las Vegas2 
Hannah Lassette Ahlers, 34 Heather Lorraine Alvarado, 35 Charleston Hartfield, 34 
Christopher Hazencomb, 44 Dorene Anderson, 49 Jennifer Topaz Irvine, 42  
Quinton Robbins, 20  Melissa V. Ramirez, 26  Jordyn N. Rivera, 21  
Carrie Rae Barnette, 34  Teresa Nicol Kimura, 38 Cameron Robinson, 28  
Jack Reginald Beaton, 54 Jessica Klymchuk, 34  Tara Ann Roe, 34  
Stephen Richard Berger, 44 Candice Ryan Bowers, 40 Carly Anne Kreibaum, 34  
Rhonda M. LeRocque, 42  Denise Burditus, 50  Victor L. Link, 55  
Brett Schwanbeck, 61  Thomas Day Jr., 54  Patricia Mestas, 67  
Brennan Lee Stewart, 30  Lisa Romero-Muniz, 48  Christopher Louis Roybal, 28 
Sandra Casey, 34  Jordan McIldoon, 24  Bailey Schweitzer, 20  
Laura Anne Shipp, 50 Denise Cohen, 58  Austin William Davis, 29  
Calla-Marie Medig, 28  James Melton, 29  Erick Silva, 21  
Susan Smith, 53  Christiana Duarte, 22  Austin Cooper Meyer, 24  
Derrick Dean Taylor, 56  Stacee Ann Etcheber, 50 Adrian Allan Murfitt, 35  
Neysa C. Tonks, 46  Brian S. Fraser, 39  Rachael Kathleen Parker, 33  
Michelle Vo, 32  Keri Galvan, 31  Jennifer Parks, 36  
Dana Leann Gardner, 52  Carolyn Lee Parsons, 31 William W. Wolfe Jr., 42  
Rocio Guillen, 40  John Joseph Phippen, 56 Kurt Allen Von Tillow, 55  
Angela C. Gomez, 20  Lisa Marie Patterson, 46 Andrea Lee Anna Castilla, 28 
Kelsey Breanne Meadows, 28 
———————————— 
1 Source: Boston Marathon Project Management Team, After Action Report for the Response to the 
2013 Boston Marathon Bombings (Boston: Boston Marathon Project Management Team, 2014), 15, 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/09/uz/after-action-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013-
boston-marathon-bombings.pdf. 
2 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018), 49, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=814668. 
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The mass shooting in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017, revealed an ongoing challenge 
with first-response agencies: dealing with the crowd. In the incident on the Strip, as in other 
emergent events, fire departments and emergency medical services (EMS) responders 
arrived within minutes at the site of the incident; meanwhile, large numbers of concert-
goers fled the scene to seek assistance and escape gunfire, with some even scaling barbed 
wire and crossing an active runway at McCarran International Airport.1 For the most part, 
the fire department and private ambulance response policies had not accounted for such 
crowd behavior. Thus, by the time the resources for the fire department and ambulances 
arrived, their response was not completely effective; many of the concert-goers had fled 
the scene, medical supplies for traumatic injuries were inadequate, first responders were 
confused about the coordination of resources, and patient tracking fell by the wayside.2 
In total, more than 800 people were injured, and approximately 250 were 
transported by professional medical services.3 Similarly, 118 of the 378 victims of the 
Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, were transported by medical providers.4 In 
other words, both incidents saw approximately 30–40 percent of the victims transported by 
professional medical services while the remaining 60–70 percent by non-medical transport 
to area hospitals in an uncoordinated effort. As noted in Boston and Las Vegas, sending 
approximately six or seven of every 10 injured patrons of an event to hospitals in an 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2018), 22, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=814668. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
3 Area hospitals treated nearly 600 patients from the shooting. Sheri Fink, “First Medics on Scene in 
Las Vegas: Other Fans,” New York Times, October 16, 2017; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
1 October After-Action Report, 13.  
4 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 




uncoordinated manner by non-traditional transport may cause an unmanageable surge to 
the local hospital system.5  
Historically, the demographics of the crowd and the likelihood of emergence have 
not been connected proactively. Could the anticipation of emergent behavior prove 
beneficial to planners and responders? One challenge in planning for crowd behavior 
during a focus event—a mass-casualty incident within a pre-planned event—is the 
unpredictable nature of the occurrence.6 The responder community contributes to this 
planning challenge because its myopic approach to event planning does not account for 
crowd behavior beyond the traditional view of the crowd as a mindless mob, which misses 
an opportunity to plan for crowd emergence. Insufficient scholarship in capturing data to 
study crowd behavior during a focus event also adds to the challenges of more effective 
planning. The scope of study on crowd behavior seems limited to pre-planned events or 
concerts without a focus event; however, limited data is available for a retrospective 
evaluation of crowd behavior during a focus event.  
Furthermore, when a focus event does occur, the circumstances—including acts 
of violence—surrounding it vary from event to event and influence the crowd’s behavior. 
Or do they? As noted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 
1 October After-Action Report, the crowd rendered unanticipated assistance to the injured 
as “immediate” responders, whose good Samaritan acts assisted in the overall response 
with medical care and evacuation.7 Ultimately, this emergence contributed positively to 
the outcome in Las Vegas: 
Good Samaritan stories of civilians—as well as many off-duty first 
responders and military—aiding, protecting, and providing care to the 
wounded were a major success observed in this response. These efforts were 
5 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the numbers transported by EMS services in Boston and Las Vegas 
represent an effective response during a mass-casualty incident. 
6 Unlike random acts of violence that occur outside an event, planned events give officials the 
opportunity to evaluate things such as crowd size, crowd demographics, event location or venue, and the 
prominence of the event. 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 18–19. 
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essential to saving many lives before emergency medical crews were able 
to access the site.8 
As FEMA notes, among the Las Vegas concert-goers were many individuals with the 
training and mindset needed to help effectively: off-duty first-responders, active-duty and 
retired military members, and nurses.9 Their prior training and experiences speak to crowd 
priming, as noted by John Bargh in emphasizing how prior knowledge and experiences can 
influence the emergent, crowd-saving behavior observed in Las Vegas.10 Other concert-
goers who were not primed for this event still contributed to the life-saving efforts 
alongside their primed fellow concert-goers. Could their behavior have been predicted, and 
could the first-response community have planned for this behavior? As far as the policies 
and procedures of response agencies are concerned, is chaos an adequate descriptor, and 
how can responders plan for it more intelligently? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Crowd behavior during the first 15 minutes of an incident mimics a complex
adaptive system. The recognition of how simple organisms are capable of producing 
complex systems can be traced back to the work of Alan Touring in 1952.11 Touring’s 
work did not gain traction until Evelyn Keller and Lee Segal picked up the theory in the 
late 1960s with their description of a complex system produced by slime mold.12 
Understanding how the formation of a system is derived from the emergence of individual 
properties that did not exist on their own could assist in the general understanding of 
emergent behavior.13 The correlation to crowds for the purposes of this research is noted 
by MacLennan: “Complex systems manifest emergent properties which cannot be 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 22. 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 18–19. 
10 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (New York: Back Bay Books, 
2005), 76. 
11 Ted Carmichael and Mirsad Hadzikadic, “The Fundamentals of Complex Adaptive Systems,” in 
Complex Adaptive Systems, ed. Ted Carmichael, Andrew Collins, and Mirsad Hadzikadic (Cham: Springer, 
2019), 6, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20309-2_1. 
12 Carmichael and Hadzikadic, 6. 
13 Bernard Testa and Lemont B. Kier, “Emergence and Dissolvence in the Self-Organisation of 
Complex Systems,” Entropy 2, no. 1 (2000): 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/e2010001. 
4 
explained in terms of simple, linear interactions among the system’s components.”14 
Planners could obtain crowd demographics (system components) prior to an event to 
leverage the crowd during a focus event and study its behavior later. The understanding of 
crowd behavior has been studied from a variety of perspectives, and it is the intent of this 
thesis to further explore how crowd behavior emerges as a complex adaptive system, 
particularly during a focus event, in hopes of increasing responder efficiency and 
effectiveness with policy recommendations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
By understanding crowd behavior as a complex adaptive system in a discordant
environment (e.g., focus event), how could emergency responders leverage a crowd for a 
more effective response? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The growing threat environment surrounding events is evolving with increasing
numbers of attacks across the globe. Although event planners within the first-responder 
community continually evaluate and adapt to the threat environment, there is a lack of 
research and adaptability emphasized in relation to the response effort. This literature 
review identifies the contributing factors in human behavior during a focus event with the 
overall intent of generating a more effective response through policies and event planning 
that acknowledge the actual behavior of crowds. It focuses on crowd behavior, particularly 
emergence in a crowd, and the correlation between complex adaptive systems and crowds. 
The parallels drawn from complex adaptive systems and crowds contribute to the overall 
understanding of crowds and how to plan for a focus event. 
1. Crowd Behavior
Crowds comprise individuals, and each individual has a unique response to a focus 
event, that is, until they are in a crowd and experience deindividualization, or lose sense of 
14 Bruce MacLennan, “Evolutionary Psychology, Complex Systems, and Social Theory” (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee, 2007), 4, http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~bmaclenn/papers/EPCSST.pdf. 
5 
personal identity.15 This phenomenon, in which individuals lose rational thinking and 
resort to primitive behavior in a crowd setting, has been studied as far back as the work of 
Gustave Le Bon in the late 1800s.16 This deindividualization serves as a defense 
mechanism against the threat environment, such as during a focus event.17 
Deindividualization is a single facet of crowd behavior, and although the phenomenon does 
take effect, not all people in the crowd experience it in the same way. There are many cited 
reasons that individuals experience deindividualization differently: the illusion of 
anonymity or unanimity, the sense of power, shared or diffused responsibility, or sensory 
arousal or overload, to name the most common.18  
The studies of Serge Moscovici are an expansion of the early works of Le Bon.19 
A pioneer of crowd behavior studies, Le Bon defined a crowd as “a gathering of individuals 
of whatever nationality, profession, or sex, and whatever be the chances that have brought 
them together.”20 Moreover, Le Bon describes the mentality of a crowd as a collective 
mind whereby each individual thinks, feels, and acts differently from his or her existence 
outside the crowd.21 While Le Bon is noted as an originator of crowd studies, his work was 
most interested in political influence. Moscovici explored crowd behavior in a similar way. 
Although their studies are not directly related to focus events, they laid the groundwork for 
understanding how or what a crowd feels and acts. For example, “Crowds have a constant 
need of mental coherence and emotional certainty to enable them to understand events and 
make sense of an unstable universe whose plaything they seem to be.”22 This observation 
15 Andrew Adamatzky, Dynamics of Crowd-Minds: Patterns of Irrationality in Emotions, Beliefs, and 
Actions, World Scientific Series on Nonlinear Science, series A, vol. 54 (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing, 2005), 6, ProQuest. 
16 Everett Dean Martin, The Behavior of Crowds: A Psychological Study (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1920), 31, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40914. 
17 Adamatzky, Dynamics of Crowd-Minds, 54:6. 
18 Adamatzky, 54:6–7. 
19 Serge Moscovici, The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 19. 
20 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (San Bernardino: Project Gutenberg, 
1996), 11, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/445. 
21 Le Bon, 13. 
22 Moscovici, The Age of the Crowd, 116. 
6 
of Moscovici is applicable to crowds experiencing a focus event through mental coherence, 
emotional certainty, and sensemaking. 
The early research of Le Bon focused on crowd behavior as it related to mob 
behavior and the politics of manipulating a crowd. The relevance of Le Bon’s research is 
in the crowd he studied and similarities identified in the modern-day crowd as defined in 
this thesis. Le Bon, by all accounts, was the first to recognize the change in behavior of 
individuals when engaged as part of a crowd. The literature of Le Bon is foundational to 
current research. Thus, by understanding the reactive variances of the crowd during 
the first 15 minutes of a focus event, the researcher argues that a more effective response 
is possible.  
Scholars have long studied what happens to individuals when they are in a crowd. 
However, when first-responder agencies plan for events or create table-top exercises to 
address a focus event, the presumed crowd behavior conforms with their pre-scripted 
response plans. Generalized response plans account for a mass-casualty incident, but 
nowhere is the crowd profile addressed as a preparatory consideration. Rick Griggs 
recognizes the importance of addressing “crowd structure” in his research on crowd 
dynamics and safety at outside events.23 The differences in crowd structure and subsequent 
behavior noted from four different events is worth studying. The results from Griggs’s 
study show varying behavior, from the crowd’s obeying orders in a stadium and remaining 
relatively calm, to being trampled to death in a chaotic and unmanageable rush, to aiding 
injured patrons immediately after a focus event occurred.24 
The idea that all individuals within a crowd make conscious decisions challenges 
deindividualization and opens the possibility for leveraging the crowd for a more effective 
response. Individuals within a crowd begin to experience emotion in a variety of ways 
23 Rick Griggs, “Fire Department Perspective: Crowd Dynamics and Safety at Outside Events” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017). 
24 Griggs, 47–77. 
7 
based on their internal sensations.25 For example, some subsets of the crowd freeze, jump, 
or even laugh in the face of fear.26  
2. Emergence
An additional consideration for crowd behavior lies in emergence, a subfield of 
collective behavior.27 Emergence has been observed and studied by researchers since the 
1950s and has evolved into an important social phenomenon that informs a significant 
element of focus-event response.28 Simply stated, emergence is the crowd’s transitioning 
into a responder role to assist their fellow man. However, emergent behavior does not 
manifest without cause. Quarantelli notes the conditions surrounding emergence: “It could 
be said that a necessary condition for emergence is a perceived need to act on urgent 
matters.”29 A notable relationship between emergence and convergence is addressed later 
in this section. Conditions for emergent behavior—as noted by Griggs—in the bombing at 
the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, United Kingdom, in May 2017 were manifest in 
thousands of patrons rushing into the arena to provide care and transport to the injured.30 
Much of the work by Griggs is relevant to the focus of this research in that it emphasizes 
emergence at several focus events. However, like other scholars who have recognized the 
impact of emergent behavior to the homeland security enterprise, Griggs also places a 
significant emphasis of research on natural disasters by evaluating earthquakes and weather 
events.31  
25 Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (New York: First 
Mariner Books, 2018), 161. 
26 Barrett, 160–61. 
27 E. L. Quarantelli, “Emergent Behaviors and Groups in the Crisis Time Periods of Disaster” 
(Newark: University of Delaware, 1994), 1, http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/591. 
28 Quarantelli, 1–2. 
29 Quarantelli, 14. 
30 Griggs, “Fire Department Perspective,” 27. 
31 Griggs, 22–27. 
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Past focus events are teeming with video evidence of the public’s assisting victims 
long before responders arrive on scene.32 Regarding assumptions about people’s reactions 
to a focus event, research has found that helping behavior far outweighs selfish behavior.33 
While emergence can take many forms, the focus of this research is related to Quarantelli’s 
idea “that a necessary condition for emergence is a perceived need to act on urgent 
matters.”34  
The importance of emergence to responders is manifold and should not be 
dismissed, or treated lightly. Considering the potentially large numbers of patients who 
might be present at a focus event, it is unrealistic to assume that first-responder agencies 
have the sufficient number of personnel or resources to provide timely care and transport 
to hundreds or even thousands of wounded victims. Emergence can display itself in many 
beneficial and life-saving forms during a focus event, including assistance with evacuation, 
hemorrhage control, the application of tourniquets, and patient transport.35 In 2013, 
Cocking and Drury referenced these emergent groups as “zero responders,” and in more 
recent research, the emergent groups at a focus event are referred to as “immediate 
responders.”36 For the sake of identifying a single term, this research uses the latter moniker 
to describe these emergent groups.  
Immediate responders are not without their share of complications to the response 
effort. The assistance of transporting victims in response to the Las Vegas high-rise 
shooting is a good example. The immediate responders circumvented the EMS transport 
system and placed victims in personal vehicles for transport to the first hospital that 
32 Amir Khorram-Manesh et al., “Immediate Response to Major Incidents: Defining an Immediate 
Responder!,” European Journal of Trauma and Emergency Surgery 46 (2020): 1310, https://doi.org/10.
1007/s00068-019-01133-1. 
33 John Drury, Group Dynamics: Mass Emergency Behavior (London: SAGE Video Tutorials, 2016), 
video transcript, 4–5. 
34 Quarantelli, “Emergent Behaviors and Groups,” 14. 
35 Tracey O. Smith et al., “Engaging Active Bystanders in Mass Casualty Events and Other Life-
Threatening Emergencies: A Pilot Training Course Demonstration,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health 
Preparedness 10, no. 2 (April 2016): 286, https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2015.177. 
36 Chris Cocking and John Drury, “Talking about Hillsborough: ‘Panic’ as Discourse in Survivors’ 
Accounts of the 1989 Football Stadium Disaster,” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 24, 
no. 2 (March/April 2014): 97, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2153; Khorram-Manesh et al., “Immediate 
Response to Major Incidents.” 
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populated on a phone search.37 While victims were transported to more definitive care, not 
all victims were delivered to the most appropriate hospital—for example, a trauma center—
for their specific wounds. An additional challenge to the non-traditional transport is 
accountability. As response agencies conclude the response effort and transition to 
recovery, they have an information gap for victim counts and conditions. Such situations 
can become problematic when the public starts demanding answers about missing friends 
or family members (see Table 1). Planning for the inevitable non-traditional transport to 
the hospital of victims by immediate responders is a prudent way forward. 
Table 1. Traditional vs. Non-traditional Transport to Hospitals 
at Focus Events38 
Focus Event # Injured Traditional Transport 
Non-traditional 
Transport % Non-traditional 
Aurora 2012 *23 3 20 87 
Boston 2013 264 118 146 55 
Las Vegas 
2017 ~850 ~250 ~600 ~70 
*The 23 patients in Aurora account only for those transported to the University of Colorado
Hospital. A total of 58 wounded were transported to hospitals.
The first-response community expects responder convergence as part of a planned 
system, but it must equally address the familiar element of emergence. As responders 
converge, immediate responders have already emerged and acted. The system has been 
redefined, and everyone has a role—as living things tend to make order of randomness.39 
37 Clark County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 1 October Operational 
Coordination, Fatality Management, and Recovery Capability Reviews—An Assessment of the Clark 
County, Nevada Public Safety System with Respect to the National Preparedness Goal Mission Areas: 
Response and Recovery (Las Vegas: Clark County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland 
Security, 2018), 17. 
38 Adapted from Tim Darragh, “At LVH, Lessons from Aurora: An ER Doctor Who Treated Colorado 
Theater Shooting Victims Urges Practice, but Be Ready to Break the Rules,” Morning Call, May 22, 2013, 
ProQuest; Boston Marathon Project Management Team, After Action Report, 4, 40; Clark County Office of 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 1 October Operational Coordination, 17. 
39 Richard T. Pascale, Mark Millemann, and Linda Gioja, Surfing the Edge of Chaos: The Laws of 
Nature and the New Laws of Business (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2000), 154. 
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When immediate responders emerge in a positive and helping way, the emerging system 
will be productive and work smoothly.40 
Studies of convergence are derived from observations of people moving toward the 
impacted area of natural disasters from the outside.41 Fritz and Mathewson have clearly 
distinguished three types of convergence: personal, a person moving by foot, vehicle, or 
other means; informational, the movement of messages; and material, the movement of 
equipment and supplies.42 For this research, the primary focus is on personal convergence 
with some interest in the informational variety. As previously noted, emergence is a 
perceived need to respond urgently whereas convergence is movement to a disaster area. 
Quarantelli makes the association between emergence and convergence in evaluating 
earthquake response: “[The] crisis phase did not provoke as much emergence as might have 
been expected given the substantially greater than typical convergence of outside groups 
on the stricken community.”43 This dichotomy is crucial in understanding and 
differentiating crowd emergence within 15 minutes of a focus event from general 
convergence in response to a reported disaster. While convergence will undoubtedly occur 
at a focus event, as noted in Griggs’s work, the event crowd falls primarily into the 
emergent category and is the emphasis of the research question. 
The experiences of the researcher have shown that slower-moving responses to 
natural disasters vis-à-vis focus events necessitate the evaluation of emergence specific to 
the latter. The immediate response of emergence within the first 15 minutes of a focus 
event is vastly different from the deliberate emergence for a natural disaster. Natural 
disasters, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, often come with a warning whereas a focus 
event does not. For example, research conducted by Nancy Casper examines how 
40 Glenda Holladay Eoyang, “Conditions for Self-Organizing in Human Systems,” Futurics 28, no. 3/4 
(2004): 12, ProQuest. 
41 Charles E. Fritz and John H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social 
Control, Publication 476 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1957), 1–3. 
42 Fritz and Mathewson, 4. 
43 Quarantelli, “Emergent Behaviors and Groups,” 8. 
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leadership manages emergent behavior during a disaster.44 Casper’s approach delves into 
managing the behavior in a natural disaster environment, which arguably evolves more 
slowly than a focus event.45 Casper has documented the shared effort of “private citizens 
who work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters.”46 
Although emergent behavior—citizens’ jumping into the fray to assist—occurs in both 
natural disasters and focus events, Casper emphasizes how organizational leadership could 
plan for groups of people in the various stages of a disaster cycle: preparedness, response, 
and recovery.47 The point is that emergent groups that show up at various stages of a 
disaster are immensely different from the emergence of a crowd at an event within the first 
15 minutes of an incident. I recognize the variance between an emergent group responding 
due to a perceived need in a natural disaster and the immediate need, for example, of a 
person requiring the life-saving intervention of a tourniquet in a focus event.48 
Emergence occurs as a product of self-organization. Casper notes that there is a 
common mission or goal observed by a group of people to explain “why” self-organization 
occurs.49 Smith and Stevens add to this principle of a common mission or goal with the 
concept of adaptivity. The conditional need to survive is a fundamental characteristic of 
adapting to the surroundings by self-organizing systems.50 It bears repeating that few 
studies have examined emergence related to focus events; indeed, the connections of self-
organization and emergence are largely applied to natural disasters. However, the identified 
44 Nancy Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior during Disaster 
Response and Recovery Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
45 Casper, 1–4. 
46 Robert A. Stallings and E. L. Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” 
in “Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Administration,” special issue, Public Administration 
Review 45 (January 1985): 94, https://doi.org/10.2307/3135003. 
47 Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 10–11. 
48 Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 11; Caitlin M. Price, “Boston 
Marathon Bombing and Experiences of Solidarity: The Race to Understanding” (master’s thesis, Virginia 
Commonwealth University, 2015), 8. 
49 Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 12. 
50 Thomas S. Smith and Gregory T. Stevens, “Emergence, Self-Organization, and Social Interaction: 
Arousal-Dependent Structure in Social Systems,” Sociological Theory 14, no. 2 (July 1996): 137, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/201903. 
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behavior of emergent groups by Stallings and Quarantelli recognizes a “we-ness” and the 
pertinence of individual knowledge, skills, and abilities to emergence in focus events.51  
3. Social Identity Theory and the Elaborated Social Identity Model 
A more modern, malleable way to examine crowd behavior during a focus event is 
through social identity theory (SIT), created by Henry Tajfel in the 1970s. The theory is 
beneficial to this research because it addresses two distinct relationships observed at a focus 
event. First, SIT helps to evaluate how a crowd experiences a focus event. Second, it 
describes the relationship between the first responders and the crowd. Understanding how 
these relationships are distinct yet related is important for the first-responder community 
in planning its response to a focus event. 
SIT applies a heuristic approach to relationships between people who form 
connections as groups—namely, in-groups and out-groups—through interaction and 
communication, as witnessed in crowds experiencing a focus event.52 Three components 
of SIT assist in identifying an individual’s group membership: the cognitive component 
understands one’s belonging to a group; the evaluative component determines the positive 
or negative connotation of belonging to the group; and the emotional component is derived 
from the other two elements. Both the cognitive and evaluative components of a group lead 
to a variety of emotions that are directed toward an individual’s group, including 
individuals and groups that have certain relationships with it.53  
In addition to these components, certain analytical markers contribute to the 
relationships established to create in-groups and out-groups: the patron–client relationship, 
honor–shame acquisition and avoidance, the challenge–response cycle, and limited good 
as it relates to resources.54 When placed in the context of a focus event, there is an 
identifiable relationship among the analytical markers and a crowd’s response to the event.  
 
51 Stallings and Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” 95. 
52 Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2011), 64. 
53 Strindberg and Wärn, 64–65. 
54 David Brannan, Anders Strindberg, and Kristin Darken, A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 67. 
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a. Patron–Client Relationship
The purpose of this section is to present the unique relationships among the 
individuals within the crowd and between the crowd and responders.  
1. Crowd: The crowd has a set of internal in-group and out-group
establishments. The two groups can be broken down into “fight” or
“flight.” The fight group comprises individuals who take positive actions
to assist themselves or others whereas the flight group comprises
individuals who flee in despair or freeze in inaction.
2. Responder–Crowd: The relationship between the responders and crowd
may or may not have been established at the outset of a focus event,
depending on the pre-incident posture of first responders and resulting
interactions. However, the relationship will unfold as responders arrive
and establish a presence. The overall success of the response could hinge
on how well this relationship is established; options include traditional
authoritarian direction by responders and the integration of the crowd as
immediate responders.
b. Honor–Shame Acquisition and Avoidance
Honor in the context of the crowd experiencing a focus event is positive public 
acknowledgment and “hero” status while the opposite, negative connotation is shame.55 
The application of honor and shame is the same for the responders. 
1. Crowd: The honor obtained by acting as an immediate responder or good
Samaritan could explain why it is common to see civilians jump into
action to form a fight in-group. Individuals can instill meaning in social
settings by belonging to an in-group.
2. Responder–Crowd: Honor and shame are precisely what is at stake for the
first responders with the rest of their community. Depending on how
55 Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, 70. 
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effective their response is to the focus event, they could gain or lose in 
either category. 
c. Challenge–Response Cycle
This cycle describes the interaction between competing groups.56 The challenge–
response cycle in this research has two components: 1) the challenge between the crowd 
and perpetrator of the focus event and 2) the interaction between responders and the crowd. 
1. Crowd: The challenge is not internal but rather imposed on the collective
crowd by an outside party. The response to such a challenge is precisely
what this research attempts to identify with an analytical approach.
2. Responder–Crowd: The first-responder community plans for the response
to a third-party disruption to the crowd, but the response to this challenge
is often based on traditional crowd psychology. The challenge–response
dynamic for responders is the emphasis of this research because of the
recognized room for improvement. The crowd and responders may have
competing actions but not competing goals.
d. Limited Good
The main limited good at a focus event is resources such as medical supplies and 
people to provide assistance. Limited good can also include status, but that is unlikely 
during a focus event. 
1. Crowd: In reference to the fight or flight groups within the crowd, the
fight group has a limited good to offer the flight group. This limited good
could include improvised tourniquets, non-traditional transport to the
hospital, or an escort to safety.
2. Responder–Crowd: The limited good from the responder to the crowd is
more obvious—medical equipment, law enforcement protection, and
transport to the hospital, among other things. Notably, the fight group
56 Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, 70. 
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provides first responders with a limited good, for instance, additional 
manpower to move injured persons or assist with application of medical 
bandages. 
The utility of SIT offers a fresh perspective of crowd behavior during the first 15 
minutes of a focus event. Namely, the individuals who comprise a crowd spontaneously 
and informally establish and function with a leadership structure that is related to their 
social category.57 The subsequent crowd reaction is as an expression of enduring 
empowerment, as explained by the elaborated social identity model. 
The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) represents the evolution of SIT and 
better explains the intergroup dynamics that yield group empowerment. Drury and Reicher 
describe empowerment as the “social-psychological state of confidence in one’s ability to 
challenge existing relations of domination.”58 ESIM intergroup dynamics of a crowd 
challenge preconceived ideas of helplessness and shed light on responder opportunities to 
leverage the crowd. With ESIM, there is a greater emphasis on the intergroup encounters 
that compose crowd events.59 The two dynamics needed for empowerment are collective 
action and asymmetry of power relations.60 This research posits that the asymmetry of 
power relations is applicable to a crowd in survival mode when first responders arrive. 
Planners have an opportunity for the social contract to be redefined between first 
responders and the crowd so that the crowd can be leveraged as part of the solution to the 
overall response. As noted by Reicher and Drury, the catalyst for support of shared goals 
from the crowd for enduring empowerment involves active measures of inclusion along 
with the need for mutual support.61 
57 Clifford Stott and John Drury, “Contemporary Understanding of Riots: Classical Crowd Psychology, 
Ideology and the Social Identity Approach,” Public Understanding of Science 26, no. 1 (2017): 11, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516639872. 
58 John Drury and Steve Reicher, “Explaining Enduring Empowerment: A Comparative Study of 
Collective Action and Psychological Outcomes,” European Journal of Social Psychology 35, no. 1 (2005): 
35, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.231. 
59 John Drury and Steve Reicher, “Collective Action and Psychological Change: The Emergence of 
New Social Identities,” British Journal of Social Psychology 39, no. 1 (December 2000): 581. 
60 Drury and Reicher, “Explaining Enduring Empowerment,” 37. 
61 Drury and Reicher, 45–48. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study investigates crowd behavior by evaluating emergence from a crowd and 
the formation of a complex adaptive system (CAS). A CAS includes such variables as 
emergence and self-organization, individualization, crowd dynamics, and crowd 
psychology. The patterns of self-organizing in the context of a focus event occur within 
the first 15 minutes of violence erupting, and within that timeframe, individuals work 
together and teams form—intertwined in complex ways. The individuals forming these ad 
hoc teams establish relationships based on any number of factors, for example, ethnicity 
and gender.62 Although an individual may participate in more than one team, patterns 
emerge, and a new system-wide behavior takes shape, displaying how individual efforts 
produce a smooth and constructive self-organizing behavior.63 The goal of this research is 
to provide actionable recommendations based on the findings. 
The use of CAS to evaluate focus event crowds demands a break from traditional 
theories. In their 2017 article, Stott and Drury discuss the evolution of crowd psychology 
from archaic theory tied to the emerging politics of industrial society to more contemporary 
sociological theories such as SIT and ESIM.64 This study is based on the researcher’s belief 
that SIT and ESIM, as complements of CAS, are better suited than crowd psychology to 
describe crowds experiencing a focus event. 
The two case studies—the Las Vegas mass shooting and the Boston Marathon 
bombing—provide the limitations and focus needed to draw conclusions on causal 
relationships between the two events. Admittedly, the mode of each attack in the case 
studies is different and could have influenced the crowd’s reaction; nevertheless, the 
objective of the research is to evaluate the focus event crowd as a CAS and understand its 
emergent behavior, not the methodology of attack. The intent is to draw correlations 
between crowd demographics and crowd response (including emergence) during the focus 
event while also examining pre-event posture and initial response by the first responders. 
 
62 Eoyang, “Self-Organizing in Human Systems,” 12. 
63 Eoyang, 12. 
64 Stott and Drury, “Contemporary Understanding of Riots,” 6. 
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Research for the cases was derived from open sources, and no new interviews were 
conducted. Some of the information is conveyed through the experience of the researcher, 
who responded to the shooting in Las Vegas. The cross-case analysis draws out similarities 
and differences between the two incidents. As noted by Kathleen Eisenhardt, “The 
juxtaposition of seemingly similar cases by a researcher looking for differences can break 
simplistic frames.”65 Ultimately the goal is to break away from the simplistic assumptions 
about crowd stress leading to panic and chaos as part of the traditional response framework. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins by evaluating focus event crowds as CASs with an emphasis on 
their non-linear nature. Chapter II challenges outdated crowd psychology and behavior 
theories in describing current focus event crowds. Self-categorization and self-organization 
theories are then used to explain some of the emergent behaviors observed in a focus event 
crowd. Chapter III presents two cases studies—of the Las Vegas mass shooting and the 
Boston Marathon bombing—to build a framework for an “out-of-the-box” solution for the 
first-response industry.66 Chapter IV describes a new framework using crowd stress, panic, 
chaos, and priming for leadership to consider in their planning. Chapter V delivers 
actionable recommendations for the first-responder community based on the research 
findings. As the likelihood of another focus event occurring seems inevitable, the 
framework derived from this research should have ample opportunity for field assessment. 
  
 
65 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 4 (October 1989): 541. 
66 Eisenhardt, 546. 
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II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE STATUS QUO: 
TAKING TIME TO UNDERSTAND THE CROWD 
This chapter offers background and a framework for understanding a crowd’s 
experience of a focus event—an intentional act of violence during a planned event. To this 
end, this chapter covers the general history of crowd psychology and behavior, as well as 
the limits of these models in contemporary focus events. Then, it applies CAS theory to a 
crowd experiencing a focus event as a fresh way to evaluate its non-linear attributes and 
behavior. This insight into the non-linear nature of crowds should help the emergency 
responder community develop contingency plans for focus events. In addition to crowd 
non-linearity, planners should understand the self-organizing, order-seeking behavior 
exhibited by a crowd at the edge of chaos. Last, the chapter applies self-organization and 
self-categorization theories to explain the crowd’s tendency to take its behavior to the edge 
of chaos before seeking order, as described by CAS. 
A. CROWD PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 
Gustave Le Bon, one of the pioneers of crowd psychology as a science in the 
mid-19th century, noted that crowds comprise individuals who lose their individuality and 
become part of a collective mind.67 Le Bon’s seemingly neutral words, in fact, laid the 
foundation of distaste for if not distrust of the crowd as a mindless mob: “Crowds are 
somewhat like the sphinx of ancient fable: it is necessary to arrive at a solution of the 
problems offered by their psychology or to resign ourselves to being devoured by them.”68 
This mentality has persisted for decades, informing the views of, among others, the 
first-responder community, which finds itself with limited options for dealing with 
bystanders who are very clearly “them.” Thus, the expectations tend to be either an 
inevitable fight or a struggle to control the mob/crowd so as not to be overrun. Christopher 
Barney similarly notes that the Le Bon mentality has made law enforcement officers and 
 
67 Le Bon, A Study of the Popular Mind, 11–13. 
68 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd and the Psychology of Revolution (San Bernardino: Project Gutenberg, 
1996), 51, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/445. 
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policymakers ill-equipped to manage crowds because of their presupposition of crowd 
irrationality and potential for violence.69 
Pioneers of crowd psychology, like Moscovici, have concentrated on how 
politicians and leaders might control and manipulate a crowd’s behavior in their favor 
during times of political and socio-economic struggle. Le Bon’s book, The Crowd, has 
been referenced by dictators, including Hitler and his propaganda minister, Joseph 
Goebbels.70 This volume lends context to the early development and influence of crowd 
psychology as a science and forms the typical foundation from which modern-day 
first-responder policies are derived. The problem is that both the crowd’s and the expert’s 
understanding of it have evolved considerably while first-responder policy and practice 
have not. 
B. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
To dismiss an event crowd simply as a group of people who have gathered for a 
common reason is to miss an opportunity in understanding how to plan more effectively 
for a crowd. The characteristics of a crowd involved in a focus event can be compared to a 
CAS. Chiefly, the complexity and non-linear make-up of an adaptive system relate directly 
to the characteristics of a crowd amid a focus event.  
Non-linear behavior is an important aspect of crowds during a focus event because 
responders have traditionally assumed that the crowd will react in outright panic and total 
chaos as an expected linear response. The general idea that crowds will behave in a 
disorderly manner is precisely “non-linear.” However, a crowd, like a complex system, is 
composed of numerous independent elements that are dynamically interconnected.71 The 
victims of the Las Vegas high-rise shooting and Boston Marathon bombing who lay on the 
ground shouting for help had independent interactions with other individuals within the 
 
69 Christopher J. Barney, “The ‘English Disease’ and Political Protest: How Social Identity Theory Can 
Enhance Public Safety at Crowd Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), 29–30, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/63495. 
70 Moscovici, The Age of the Crowd, 64–65. 
71 Carla Crandall, “If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the 
Rise in Targeted Killing,” Seton Hall Law Review 43, no. 2 (2013): 604. 
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vicinity; fellow crowd members displayed stress while performing life-saving actions of 
emergence or fleeing from the scene without offering assistance. Although all individuals 
do not react in the same way, their actions demonstrate interconnected relationships with 
other members of the crowd. For instance, if two bystanders within the vicinity of a victim 
are both ready to help and the first one renders aid, the second bystander will move on to 
assist someone else. However, the non-linear make-up of complex systems does not 
assume this scenario will play out around a second victim because the two hypothetical 
bystanders might flee and not provide him with assistance. When observed from a distance, 
a crowd involved in a focus event may appear to respond with mass panic, but when 
evaluated more closely, the crowd mimics a CAS, including all of the nuanced patterns that 
develop within it, particularly during a focus event.72 The reason the crowd appears to be 
in mass panic can be explained by CAS’s operating at the edge of chaos. 
Planners generally assume that crowds involved in a focus event react in chaos, but 
the lens of CAS suggests such a perception is to be expected. As described by Pascale, 
Millemann, and Gioja, “In the face of threat, or when galvanized by a compelling 
opportunity, living things move toward the edge of chaos.”73 Disorder is a necessary 
condition of CASs for order to emerge rather than be forcefully designed into the system.74 
When this concept is put into the context of crowd evacuation, for example, an observer 
will discover that many of the elements composing a crowd that resemble disorderly 
interaction may evolve into pattern creation.75 With this understanding, crowds no longer 
present absolute chaos, but live on the edge of chaos. The challenge to the responder 
community, then, is grasping what the edge of chaos means to planning and response. I 
agree with Stott and Drury about the need to abandon both the traditional view of crowds 
as mindless groups of panicking people and the consequent response planning. 
Furthermore, in the context of CAS, the responsibility of this paradigm shift from a chaotic 
 
72 Bruce A. Waltuck, “Characteristics of Complex Systems,” Journal for Quality and Participation 34, 
no. 4 (January 2012): 13–14, ProQuest. 
73 Pascale, Millemann, and Gioja, Surfing the Edge of Chaos, 6. 
74 James Ladyman, James Lambert, and Karoline Wiesner, “What Is a Complex System?,” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Science 3, no. 1 (January 2013): 58, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0056-8. 
75 Ladyman, Lambert, and Wiesner, 59. 
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expectation to one of understanding will benefit the response community through 
effectiveness. The area between chaos and stability can only exist in a complex system.76 
Furthermore, the interactions among individuals within the crowd are what equalizes 
behavior on the edge of chaos—a balancing between order and disorder.77  
The ability of the complex system to adapt is precisely what makes it so complex 
and more difficult to understand and anticipate—especially in a focus event.78 However, 
knowing an adaptive component exists makes it possible to find order because the 
adaptivity of the system will pull back from complete chaos and keep it from going over 
the edge. Planning for a focus event with the knowledge that total chaos will not occur 
empowers responders to leverage the adaptive nature of crowds in the moment of crisis.  
C. SELF-ORGANIZATION 
One of the phenomena associated with the adaptive nature of complex systems is 
the recognition of pattern development as a natural way for the system to adapt to its new 
environment.79 An example of how crowds adapt in a focus event, as a component of any 
CAS, is through self-organization and emergence.80 Self-organization is the process by 
which internal components (individuals) interact in dynamic ways to generate system-wide 
patterns.81 Another definition is “a process in which pattern at the global level of a system 
emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components of a 
system.”82 The self-organized component of a CAS occurs organically and relies on the 
adaptive nature of the components of the system. For this research, it involves the crowd’s 
responding to a focus event and the subsequent will to survive or assist others in survival. 
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The self-organizing of a CAS is a means for the crowd to achieve order within the 
spontaneous situation it finds itself in.83 
Self-organization as a theory explains why people organize themselves to gain a 
semblance of order when they are suddenly thrust into a situation perceived as chaos.84 
Self-organization can be observed in daily life at places like the supermarket or merchant 
stores. When lines exceed the given space, people self-organize in a fashion that extends 
the line to arrange an ordered approach to the cashier’s counter. A line wrapping around a 
store or the behavior of drivers sitting in traffic are consistent with a multitude of patterns 
that dictate individual operation in daily living. Patterns are a natural component of human 
life and dictate how individuals find a sense of organization and order. 
D. SELF-CATEGORIZATION 
Self-categorization starts with the self and what the individual brings to a situation 
relative to one’s knowledge about the self.85 When individuals interact with other 
contextual factors, they develop self-categorization associated with them.86 In other words, 
individuals in a crowd bring a level of awareness about themselves into an intergroup 
relationship. The role an individual takes when the context of the situation unfolds during 
a focus event directly relates to his or her knowledge about oneself. An individual’s self-
concept varies, based on the context, time, and situation, in fitting into a particular self-
category.87 
The Boston and Las Vegas case studies in the next chapter demonstrate that large 
numbers of individuals self-categorized outside the expectations of first responders—in 
other words, they did not see themselves as victims. As individuals experiencing a focus 
event, they identified with a particular category, for argument’s sake, as individuals capable 
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of rendering first-aid. In those first critical 15 minutes after a focus event commences, there 
are not enough professional first-responder resources on scene to attend to all of the injured 
patrons. Nevertheless, individuals in the crowd often self-categorize into an intergroup of 
good Samaritans to act and deliver medical aid. 
Social influence plays a role in an individual’s desire to associate with others 
through self-category. Though the individual experiences depersonalization, a new shared 
identity is born along with all of those around him in this redefined social reality. 
Furthermore, with this shared reality, the individual perceives others around him as part of 
himself and thus creates an emotional and behavioral bond whereby he cares for, acts in 
the interest of, and coordinates with those other individuals, even if they are strangers.88  
In the context of a crowd during the first moments of a focus event, all of those constituting 
the crowd have a shared interest in forging an emotional and behavioral bond. Small groups 
are typically referenced in comparing conformity and polarity phenomena within identified 
in-groups.89 As such, the introduction of self-categorization in this research supplies a 
theory to apply to individuals at focus events to obtain a greater understanding of crowd 
behavior in the first 15 minutes post-perturbation.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The old tenets of crowd psychology and behavior are not applicable to modern-era 
event planning or, more importantly, contingency planning for a focus event. This thesis 
presents the idea of the responder community’s approaching the crowd experiencing a 
focus event as a CAS and accounting for the crowd’s non-linear quality to achieve a more 
effective response. The explanation of CAS as non-linear debunks the myth of mass chaos, 
along with the associated crowd stress and panic. Planners and responders are now 
challenged to break from traditional frameworks and contingency plan for crowds 
experiencing a focus event as complex adaptive systems. The CAS nature of crowds and 
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the avoidance of chaos are evidence of self-organization to obtain order. Last, 
self-organization leads the research to explore priming and emergence to help clarify how 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter evaluates the Boston Marathon bombing and the Las Vegas high-rise 
shooting as complex adaptive systems and draws relevance from these two case studies 
from a variety of angles. Each case study examines the demographics of the crowds, the 
pre-incident first-responder posture, crowd behavior and response, and the responders’ 
initial response, concentrating on the first 15 minutes of the focus event response effort and 
corresponding crowd behavior. The findings support the non-linearity of crowds 
experiencing a focus event. Furthermore, planning lessons identify the importance of 
pre-staged, pre-coordinated resources and their effect on the overall response. 
A. BOSTON 
In observance of Patriot’s Day on April 15, 2013, the city of Boston hosted the 
117th Boston Marathon. The race featured a total of 27,000 official runners with an 
additional 3,000 unregistered “bandit” runners participating.90 Advertised as a family 
event, the Boston Marathon traditionally opened the starting and finish lines to the public 
with no screening of persons or baggage. The race and spectators were shocked by an 
explosion near the finish line at 671 Boylston Street at 2:49 p.m. and another explosion 
only 13 seconds later, approximately one city block up the course, at 755 Boylston Street 
(see Figure 1).91 At the time of the explosion, approximately 5,000 runners were still on 
the course.92 After the attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation determined that the 
explosions had been caused by two separate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with 
 
90 Boston Fire Department, 117th Boston Marathon After Action Report (Boston: Boston Fire 
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bandit runners are injured because bibs are initially registered to someone else when they are purchased 
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intent to harm.93 In all, the bombing resulted in three spectator fatalities and 264 injured 
persons.94 
 
Figure 1. Location of Explosion Sites at the Boston Marathon95 
1. The Crowd 
The crowd at the Boston Marathon comprised two types of people. The first 
included participants in the marathon, ranging from elite world athletes, to mobility-
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impaired competitors, to average Americans trying to achieve a personal bucket-list goal.96 
The second included spectators at the starting and finish lines. The responders preparing 
for this event had anticipated a fairly representative crowd of men, women, and children of 
all ages. Furthermore, because of the history of this event, the number of spectators 
arranged at the high-profile areas near the starting and finish lines had been predicted and 
planned for. 
2. Pre-incident First-Responder Posture
The planners and public officials in Boston had modified the all-hazards approach 
to their plan over several years to increase coordination and response capability. They had 
a strong level of coordination and command presence by standing up the Multi Agency 
Coordination Center (MACC) with public safety representatives from the eight cities and 
towns that hosted the Boston Marathon.97 The planners of the 2013 Boston Marathon had 
applied lessons learned from the previous year, when many runners and spectators suffered 
from heat-related ailments along the course. In 2013, officials increased planning efforts 
by enhancing medical protocols and capabilities to bolster the medical system in order to 
support larger numbers of patients than they had previously prepared for—thus avoiding 
unnecessary patient transports to area hospitals.98 In addition, the Boston Fire Department 
increased staffing and provided their firefighters with additional training and equipment 
(e.g., self-contained breathing apparatus facemasks with air-purifying respirator canisters, 
field tourniquets, and radiation monitors) to address an all-hazards incident.99 The 
increased training, equipment, and staffing levels were good examples of how the Boston 
response community adjusted its planning based on their previous experiences and lessons 
learned. 
96 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, After Action Report, 35–36. 
97 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, 71. 
98 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, 72. 
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The Boston response community practiced a robust all-hazards approach in 
preparation for the 2013 marathon.100 The planning process included partnerships 
alongside local fire, police, and EMS with the Boston Athletic Association, Massachusetts 
Emergency Management, Massachusetts State Police, Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health, Massachusetts National Guard (MANG), American Red Cross, Boston Public 
Health Commission, and area hospitals.101 The system was created as an all-hazards 
medical system with the intention of ensuring capabilities to handle a surge of patients with 
injuries ranging from scrapes and blisters to cardiac arrest.102 The EMS surge capability 
entailed the deployment of 26 medical tents along the race course, of which eight had an 
enhanced capability.103 As one of the eight tents, the Alpha Medical Tent, located near the 
finish line, served as the EMS hub for the race and was staffed by Boston EMS and medical 
volunteers including licensed physicians, physician assistants, and nurses.104 The 
adjustments made by planners for the 2013 Boston Marathon based on previous 
experiences and lessons learned from previous years proved beneficial in the EMS 
response to the bombing. 
To address potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 
(CBRNE) hazards, Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs) were pre-deployed by 
planners to provide for a rapid response.105 Each JHAT comprised representatives from the 
Boston Fire Department’s Hazardous Materials Team, Boston Police Department’s 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Team, MANG’s Civil Support Team, and the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation.106 The JHATs used mobile and fixed monitoring equipment to 
constantly assess for CBRN contaminants in their respective areas.107 In addition to 
JHATs, the Boston Fire Department staffed the Hazmat Group, consisting of a pre-staged 
decontamination engine company with seven personnel, and a multi-agency Special 
Emergency Response Team, which included six personnel from the Boston Fire 
Department, the Boston Police Department, and MANG’s Civil Support Team.108 The 
importance of the pre-incident deployment of these CBRNE resources is explained later in 
this chapter. 
The Boston Police Department set up and staffed a Unified Coordination Center 
(UCC) to address the command-and-control element of the marathon, which included 
representatives from various agencies including a deputy chief from the Boston Fire 
Department.109 Throughout the event, the UCC coordinated with additional multi-
disciplinary partners that staffed the MACC.110 The multiple agencies making up the UCC 
actively used the situational awareness tool WebEOC throughout the event to share 
information.111 Despite these measures, Boston’s After Action Report notes that it took 
approximately 30 minutes to stand up the UCC.112 This author posits that a pre-established 
UCC would expedite the coordination and deployment of resources including those 
dedicated to patient care. 
3. Crowd Behavior and Response
While two exploding IEDs stunned the crowd that fateful day in Boston, the 
people’s response challenged the notion that chaos ensues in such crises. Through the CAS 
lens, the crowd acted seamlessly and showed the asymmetry of power relations of the 
106 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, 76. 
107 Boston Marathon Project Management Team, 80. 
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ESIM, as discussed in Chapter I. In other words, some individuals within the crowd reacted 
as though they were prepared for the focus event and expected to be included in the 
response effort by exhibiting the ability to care for themselves and others—and not relying 
on the assistance of responders. For example, as described by witnesses, the crowd acted 
collectively to assist the injured, demonstrating life-saving behaviors, solidarity, and 
shared emotion.113 According to a fire officer who responded, one runner gave up his belt 
to use as an improvised tourniquet: “At that point the runner assisted me.”114 In another 
account of the crowd’s behavior, a store manager near the bombings reported that people 
had asked what they could do in desperation to help and created makeshift responder 
groups.115 The crowd in Boston exemplified the intergroup dynamics of ESIM, not panic 
or chaos. 
Some crowd members were obstacles to responders during mitigation efforts. For 
example, individuals within the crowd at the Boston Marathon were heard by responders 
“screaming all over due to grotesque dismemberments and lacerations.”116 This crowd 
behavior challenged the responders’ ability to focus, an example of a distractor. Distractors 
can also present themselves, as they did during this focus event, in unintentional 
impediments to the response effort. For instance, as responders were attempting to load the 
most critical patients into transport units, crowd members were also trying to load people 
in the same transport units without consideration of patient condition and triage 
prioritization.117 The distractors and impediments from the crowd caused treatment delays 
for some victims because of the discord between the responders’ priorities and the 
civilians’ arbitrary attempts to assist.118 
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4. First Responders’ Call to Duty 
The initial response within the first 15 minutes of the Boston Marathon bombing 
contained notable lessons to build upon. While it is typically difficult to predict how many 
victims to prepare for at any given event should a mass-casualty incident erupt, the 
response in Boston was quick to react positively to the 264 victims at the two bombing 
sites because of the planning leading up to the event. The response followed the all-hazards 
approach that planners had put into place. 
The planners’ pre-staged medical tents along the marathon route proved well 
positioned for a quick response to the two bombings, especially given the robustly staffed 
Alpha Medical Tent located close to the first bombing site near the finish line. The Alpha 
Medical Tent pivoted from treating runners to responding to a mass-casualty incident with 
large numbers of critical patients.119 Located near the finish line, the medical hub for the 
marathon was quickly adapted to function as the EMS response hub for running triage, 
treatment, and management of the transport units.120  
A notable shortcoming in the EMS response was the lack of available trauma care 
supplies and transport units. The responders on scene did well to adapt to the situation by 
using “cravats” (triangular bandages) as tourniquets and bandages to stop bleeding.121 
However, given the focus of this research to leverage the crowd to assist in the response, 
teaching the active bystander how to make an improvised tourniquet out of a cravat in an 
austere environment might be too technical or complicated compared to the verbal 
instructions or intuitive use of a tourniquet. Moreover, despite the abundance of responders 
on scene during the mass-casualty incident, the sheer number of victims overwhelmed 
them. Having enough medical supplies for immediate responders might have made a 
difference in the first 15 minutes while reinforcements were en route. The second factor 
effecting the EMS component of this response was the number of available patient 
transport units. Boston EMS immediately requested an additional 73 transport units, and 
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all of the staged transport units outside the blast area showed discipline by not entering the 
scene until requested.122 However, the additional transport units were still not enough for 
the 264 injured individuals. Responders quickly identified a Boston Police Department 
prisoner transport wagon and employed it to transport patients to Massachusetts General 
Hospital.123 The adaptability of the first responders was the key to addressing the 
EMS-related challenges. 
The responders in Boston were forced to adapt because of the site layout for the 
marathon. Planners in Boston engineered the environment with interlocking pedestrian 
rails and bicycle racks to limit the access of pedestrians and vehicles throughout the 
marathon course; it also adversely created a barrier for responders to access the crowd.124 
Conversely, the interlocking rail restricted the crowd from accessing responders and 
medical supplies and evacuating the injured. Adaptability of the plan and situation by the 
responders was a continued theme in the response to the bombing. 
The responsiveness of the JHATs was a highlight of the initial response. The ability 
of the JHAT teams to determine quickly that the IEDs were not dispersal devices and did 
not contain hazards that would require decontamination was critical to expediting treatment 
of patients.125 JHATs quickly relayed to all healthcare partners that the IEDs had not 
released CBRN contaminants in the explosions, thus expediting medical treatment because 
there was no need for patient decontamination.  
B. LAS VEGAS 
On October 1, 2017, an estimated 22,000 people attended the Route 91 Harvest 
Country Music Festival throughout the day in Las Vegas, Nevada.126 On the final night of 
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the three-day outdoor concert, a lone gunman opened fire from the 32nd floor of the 
Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino across the street from the 17.5 acre venue.127 The terror 
persisted for the concert-goers for over 10 minutes before the gunman ceased firing and 
took his own life.128 This focus event, deemed the deadliest mass shooting in modern U.S. 
history, resulted in 58 fatalities and over 850 injured, including responders.129 I responded 
to the incident as the commander of a CBRNE response task force. 
 
Figure 2. Location of Las Vegas High-Rise Shooting130 
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1. The Crowd 
The crowd attending the Route 91 Harvest Festival has been described as having a 
cowboy mentality, with a “get it done” and “tough as nails” attitude exemplified on the 
night of the incident.131 The cowboy mentality could be attributed to the actual cowboys in 
attendance or the off-duty military personnel, medical providers, and first responders 
among the concert-goers.132 The shooting erupted during the final act of the festival, 25 
minutes into Jason Aldean’s performance at 10:05 p.m.133 Considering the festival’s start 
time of 2:45 p.m. that afternoon and a crowd drinking alcohol, many patrons were 
intoxicated and impaired and posed challenges to the response effort.134 While concert-
goers with a cowboy mentality yielded enormous assistance to responders—as did the 
athletes and families in Boston—the intoxication of attendees clearly affected the crowd’s 
initial response efforts. For example, first responders were diverted from assisting injured 
concert attendees to restraining intoxicated individuals from impeding rescue efforts.135 
The presence of alcohol increased the complexity of the patron–client relationship between 
the crowd and responders. The intoxicated individuals added a layer of stress that was 
counterproductive in helping fellow concert-goers and the overall response effort because 
of their impaired judgment.  
Another aspect in evaluating the crowd in this case involves not only its 
demographic composition but also the crowd’s familiarity with the geographic area where 
the event was held. Most of the crowd attending the Route 91 Harvest Festival was not 
local to Las Vegas, with 90 percent of the concert-goers coming from out of town and 60 
percent of those hailing from California.136 This unique out-of-towner attribute affected 
the response and coordination of patient transports to the appropriate medical facilities 
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because immediate responders did not know where to go or transported the injured to 
medical facilities incapable of treating traumatic wounds. Additionally, responders were 
confused by the multiple scenes created by the expansive geographical area covered by 
fleeing concert-goers unfamiliar with the locale.137 
2. Pre-incident First-Responder Posture
The primary focus on pre-incident first-responder posture in this section includes 
the pre-positioned command-and-control elements on the night of the shooting and the 
planning limitations imposed on Southern Nevada fire departments by ordinances and 
statutes. The pre-incident first-responder posture did significantly affect the response to 
this focus event, as 51 personnel from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
(LVMPD) but no responders from the Clark County Fire Department staffed the event.138 
Notably, staffing in the Las Vegas valley varies from one jurisdiction to another and from 
one event to another. For example, when event promoters prioritize crowd control and 
order—and fail to consider the potential for injuries beyond first-aid, alcohol intoxication, 
and one-off major medical episodes—police disproportionately staff the event.  
The Nevada Revised Statutes limit a fire department’s authority to staff special 
events to medical care and do not include command-and-control staffing options.139 The 
event promoters have the option to contract with private entities without consulting the fire 
department, depending on local ordinance. During the focus event on October 1, the 
minimum required EMS staffing, based on the location, event type, and expected number 
of attendees, was “one first-aid station at the site of the special event . . . with at least one 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse or paramedic in lieu of an emergency medical 
technician; and . . . two or more roving intermediate emergency medical technician 
teams.”140 Notably, the single medical tent was located at the far northeast corner and the 
137 Clark County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 165. 
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stage at the southern-most area of the 17.5 acre site at the time of the shooting.141 The 
single medical tent was the only pre-staged location with medical supplies.  
First-responder command and control rely on strong communications, but there 
were early gaps in communication in response to the shooting in Las Vegas. The LVMPD 
and Community Ambulance dispatch centers were both in contact with their personnel 
working the Route 91 Harvest Festival leading up to and during the focus event. The fire 
alarm office (FAO), however, was not incorporated by the fire department into the event 
planning for the festival, thus challenging a coordinated response among the three fire 
departments—the Clark County Fire Department, Las Vegas Fire & Rescue, and the North 
Las Vegas Fire Department—under the same set of FAO dispatchers.142 Because the FAO 
dispatchers were unaware of the large event, they struggled to communicate with the 
incident commander when the event became a mass-casualty incident.143 Moreover, the 
Incident Command System structure was unclear to the dispatchers, which resulted in their 
confusion about command and control, as well as their communication directly with 
various sections and branches rather than the incident commander.144 Reacting to this 
confusion, some responders circumvented command with improvised resource requests 
that ultimately challenged resource accountability and operational coordination.145  
In contrast to Boston, there were no pre-deployed CBRNE assets for the Route 91 
Harvest Festival. Because the focus event was a mass shooting, the lack of pre-deployed 
CBRNE resources did not hinder an all-hazards approach to the initial response efforts. 
However, the perpetrator of the focus event shot a 43,000-gallon tank containing jet fuel 
adjacent to the venue at McCarran International Airport.146 There was not an immediate 
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need for CBRNE or supporting hazardous material team resources on October 1—but only 
because the fuel tank did not rupture when it was hit. 
3. Crowd Behavior and Response
The crowd on October 1, 2017, at the Route 91 Harvest Festival was sent into panic 
when bullets began raining from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay. The crowd in Las 
Vegas when viewed through the CAS lens also exhibited similar ESIM intergroup 
dynamics to those observed in Boston, empowering the group despite the differences in 
attack modality. The crowd in Las Vegas sprung into the ESIM dynamic of collective 
action as noted by paramedic Amber Ratto of AMR: “We had people who were shot 
holding pressure on other people’s wounds.”147 Observation 14 in FEMA’s After-Action 
Report speaks extensively to the crowd’s collective action to provide life-saving measures 
and rescue aid to fellow concert-goers.148 The large number of primed off-duty responders 
who were in the crowd contributed to the asymmetry of power relations between the 
responders and crowd. Off-duty responders have a natural in-group association with each 
other and are accustomed to operating in an austere environment like the one created by 
the shooting. The assistance offered by off-duty responders ranged from local responders 
to a considerable number of responders visiting from the Los Angeles area, all of whom 
made improvised tourniquets or triaged, treated, and transported victims.149 Despite the 
considerable documented responders in the crowd, civilians also contributed to the 
response effort, as they did in Boston, by lending medical care and evacuation assistance.150 
As in Boston, the crowd in Las Vegas also presented challenges to the responders 
in the form of distractors. For example, some distractors took the form of intoxicated 
individuals attempting to assist with treatment of victims. One particularly intoxicated, 
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off-duty, out-of-jurisdiction responder even assaulted medical care providers when he 
disagreed with the treatments they were administering.151 Furthermore, off-duty responders 
became distractors to the on-duty first-responders by adding unintentional complexity with 
well-meaning attempts to take command or contribute.152 As in Boston, the distractors 
caused by the crowd hindered response and coordination efforts. 
Additional distractors that emerged outside the first 15 minutes of response are 
worth mentioning. Many concert-goers fled the scene, seeking refuge from the incessant 
gunfire and stopping in more than 20 different locations up to four square miles away from 
the venue; they posed additional coordination challenges, created overall confusion, and 
contributed to responder anxiety when they called 9-1-1 to request medical aid as shooting 
victims at these additional off-site locations.153 The crowd’s use of smart phones to locate 
hospitals or summon ride-share transportation to app-recommended medical facilities 
proved another distractor that helped and hindered operations because victims needing 
transportation were taken to area hospitals, but trauma centers were underutilized and 
patient tracking suffered.154 
4. First Responders’ Call to Duty 
The persistent gunfire for more than 10 minutes also hindered the response in Las 
Vegas.155 The relentless gunfire was a distractor that kept all fire and EMS resources not 
already on scene from entering the area deemed a “hot zone.” Battalion 2 established 
incident command eight minutes into the shooting, and it took 15 minutes to assign North, 
South, and West divisions and establish the unified command, according to the timeline 
presented in FEMA’s 1 October After-Action Report.156 This delay in establishing a 
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command structure contributed to overall confusion with communications and resource 
tracking. 
The responders in Las Vegas were forced to adapt to an evolving scene and incident 
footprint. All three of the geographic divisions were off site, so all patient contact in the 
first 15 minutes was driven by individuals who fled the concert and made their way to each 
respective division. North, South, and West divisions facilitated triage, treatment, and 
transport at their three respective locations while the immediate medical care provided 
within the venue was limited by the amount of available medical supplies specific to trauma 
care, much like in Boston.157 Because the number of medical providers assigned to the 
event were quickly overwhelmed, many of the law enforcement officers assigned to work 
the special event assisted with staging, triage, and treatment. However, they lacked 
coordination with the overall response.158  
In addition to not having adequate medical supplies on site for a mass-casualty 
incident, private vehicles were utilized because there were not enough transport units 
available for the sizeable number of victims requiring transport.159 In many accounts, 
responders placed no more than a single patient in a transport unit, which contributed to 
the lack of available ambulances to transport the volume of patients. The use of private, 
non-coordinated transportation caused an imbalanced strain on the hospital system, and 
patient accountability, including documentation, suffered as a result.160  
Similar to the Boston Marathon bombing, a CBRNE element responded to this 
focus event, but unlike Boston, the need for CBRNE resources was not urgent in the 
response. The shooter attempted to rupture nearby fuel tanks at McCarran International 
Airport by firing multiple rounds into them but was unsuccessful in breaching the tanks.161 
In addition, the shooter’s vehicle, located at the parking garage of the Mandalay Bay, 
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contained exploding targets and explosive precursors that required CBRNE and Bomb 
Squad resources to render them safe.162 Although the CBRNE element was not an 
immediate response concern, these resources were used in response to the focus event.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The common thread between the crowds in Boston and Las Vegas was their 
non-linear nature. Both case studies highlight the CAS attributes of these crowds, including 
the observed emergence explained by ESIM. Recognizing such attributes rationalizes 
crowd behavior during focus events and debunks the preconceptions of chaos. 
Furthermore, leaders and planners can use the information as a jumping-off point for future 
policies and planning. 
Officials who plan events are responsible for and should be concerned with 
understanding the potential effects of their engineered safety measures, such as pedestrian 
rails, on a mass-casualty incident response. In those initial moments of the first gunshots 
or after a blast, as in Las Vegas and Boston, responders should possess the training to adapt 
quickly to the environment and manage the individual distractors created within and by the 
crowd.  
The emphasis of pre-incident posture in this chapter centered on command and 
control and patient care. A robust pre-incident posture prepares the responders and event 
staff for a more coordinated, responsive effort should a focus event occur. While the 
responder community has a long-standing history of producing lessons learned, it seems 
such lessons are mere observations in most cases. I urge planners to incorporate more 
thoroughly the noted crowd behaviors with appropriate adjustments tailored to the 
responders’ ability to leverage the crowd—thus converting lessons learned to lessons 
applied.  
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IV. BEND, DON’T BREAK: 
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EVENT PLANNING  
Planners now know to assess crowd demographics in planning for the patron–client 
relationship, which creates the identifiable, stress-driven, fight or flight in-groups. 
Responders should be prepared to help those individuals of the crowd who are frozen or 
have defaulted to flight mode. Equally important are having sufficient resources, 
leveraging the collective action of the primed crowd, and embracing the asymmetry of 
power. The first-responder community can leverage the group empowerment of ESIM 
when crowds like those in Boston and Las Vegas act with a willingness to assist without 
hesitation. The first-responder community can leverage the crowd during the first 15 
minutes of a focus event when it has a better understanding of these historical crowd 
behaviors. When focus events are evaluated through the lens of CAS and ESIM, planners 
recognize that the social identity and position of individuals in a crowd will change during 
the course of the event based on their self-categorization, and when individuals engage in 
collective action, they share a common social identity.163 The collective action of crowds 
leads to group empowerment. Responders and planners have an opportunity to leverage 
group empowerment, by understanding the roles of stress, panic, chaos, and priming, as 
revealed in immediate-responder emergence at focus events. 
A. STRESS 
One component to event planning for both policymakers and responders includes 
understanding the potential implications of stress levels of attendees during a focus event. 
Stress comes in many forms; on the one hand, stress can be positive, such as going for a 
promotion, or it can be negative and tolerable, such as a spousal dispute. On the other hand, 
stress can be chronic and toxic, such as trying to figure out where the next meal is coming 
from.164 This research centers on the type of stress that drives the fight-or-flight behavior 
experienced by individuals in a focus event crowd. Unfortunately, as noted by other 
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researchers, the empirical data to support this type of research is scarcely available due to 
the nature of the environment needed; therefore, the majority of the data is derived from 
computer simulations.165  
Life-threatening environments, such as focus events, may precipitate the fight-or-
flight response in individuals. Bernadette von Dawans et al. emphasize the importance of 
stress to individuals in a crowd in their article for Psychological Science: “Stress is an 
essential psychobiological mechanism that tunes the human organism to react to 
demanding circumstances.”166 Moreover, the additional demands of the threatening 
environment that create stress for individuals may be real or perceived, depending on the 
availability of adaptive coping mechanisms.167 The stress presenting at a focus event will 
trigger the brain to respond, activating the sympathetic nervous system, which releases 
noradrenaline and adrenaline.168 Although this research emphasizes the first 15 minutes of 
response to a focus event, the release of adrenaline and noradrenaline are of primary 
interest to the responder community because along with the release of adrenal 
glucocorticoids, they reach a peak level in the 15- to 30-minute range and slowly decline 
to pre-stress levels after 60–90 minutes.169 While in that initial chemical release, some 
individuals experience effective coping whereby the brain and body coordinate functions 
of adaptation to the stress.170 
Not all individuals within the crowd experience stress or cope in the same way. 
This explanation of individually experienced stress and the associated adaptive coping 
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mechanisms gives leadership within the responder community another example of the 
non-linear nature of crowds. Furthermore, it highlights that the timeframe of the stress-
induced chemical release coincides with the expected arrival of most responder 
resources—a critical time at which individuals within the crowd experience either fight or 
flight. Finally, within this timeframe, individuals who are coping well tend to demonstrate 
prosocial behaviors as a functional protective response, meaning they seek groups that can 
exchange joint protection during the focus event.171  
B. PANIC 
Leaders responsible for developing response plans and the responders who carry 
them out have been pre-programmed to anticipate a panicked crowd amid a focus event. 
However, the “panic” descriptor is not supported by empirical evidence.172 Moreover, the 
concept of panic as crowd behavior is under scrutiny among the scientific community. The 
word is derived from the name of the Greek god Pan, who generated fear in the absence of 
an actual threat.173 In the context of a focus event, the use of panic to describe the crowd is 
inaccurate because the threat is real and still active in some cases. Quarantelli and Ripley 
both acknowledge three factors needed for an individual to panic: the feeling of being 
trapped, a sensation of great helplessness, and a sense of extreme isolation.174 Again, in the 
context of a focus event, it is very unlikely that a person experiences all three. Indeed, this 
research has shown how the actions of individuals in a crowd mitigate each of the factors 
needed for panic to exist. 
Panic and, more specifically, the antiquated framework for mass panic of a crowd 
conflict with what is known about crowds today. The previously established elements of 
mass panic are as follows: the crowd is less intelligent than an individual and prone to 
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simple emotions; the crowd reaction to a focus event will be disproportionate to the actual 
threat; the overreaction will be contagious; and social bonds within the crowd will dissolve 
for self-preservation.175 This research has shown these elements of the mass panic 
framework to be unsupported at every level. As noted by John Drury, “People die in a 
crowd in an emergency, not out of selfishness, but out of caring for each other according 
to these theories.”176 
The sight of people running in every direction without concern for anyone around 
them is precisely how people are portrayed on film; it makes for great entertainment and 
equally powerful discourse. Scientifically, panic has been used in social psychology to 
discount crowds and change the narrative to explain angry mobs, starting with Le Bon in 
the late 1800s.177 The use of panic in this way has delegitimized crowds throughout time 
and fostered an authoritarian approach to emergency response planning.178 To the 
detriment of the response effort, the discourse of mass panic has led to the mismanagement 
of responders. In particular is the intentional withholding of information from the public to 
keep people from panicking.179 Communication with people is a critical element between 
leadership, responders, and organizers and should not be dismissed because there is a fear 
of causing panic among the crowd.180 Withholding information or dispensing 
misinformation for fear of panic potentially increases existing fears or discredits 
authorities.181  
 
175 Drury, Cocking, and Reicher, “Everyone for Themselves?,” 488. 
176 Drury, Group Dynamics, 4. 
177 Cocking and Drury, “Talking about Hillsborough,” 87–88. 
178 Cocking and Drury, 88. 
179 Kashmira Gander, “After Trump Downplayed COVID, Fauci Says ‘Totally Nonsense’ to Withhold 
Information to Avoid Alarming People,” Newsweek, October 22, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-
downplayed-covid-fauci-totally-nonsense-withhold-information-avoid-alarm-1541230. 
180 Ripley, The Unthinkable, 156–57. 
181 Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch‐Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a 
City against Panic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 34, no. 2 (2002): 220, https://doi.org/10.1086/338711. 
47 
C. CHAOS 
Crowds reside at the edge of chaos rather than occupy chaos, as complex systems 
are capable of adaptation.182 In contrast, “chaos is that unlikely occurrence in which 
patterns cannot be found nor interrelationships understood.”183 The two main factors 
contributing to a CAS living at the edge of chaos, not in chaos, are non-linearity and 
underlying order.184 One example of the non-linearity of a crowd during a focus event, is 
the “tenuous connection between cause and effect” of emergence by well-intentioned 
individuals.185 Small actions by individuals within the crowd can have significant effects 
on the outputs of the response, such as individuals’ transporting victims to the hospital in 
personal vehicles resulting in an unmanageable patient surge on a single hospital. The non-
linear actions of the crowd are a natural search for order, as explained in subsequent 
paragraphs.  
In chaos theory research, the recognition of complex phenomena directs attention 
to what makes a system complex and adaptive. The answer is in the non-linear nature of 
CAS—straight linearity does not exist.186 In the context of life and the individuals within 
a crowd, it makes sense to see no straight path from encounter to encounter. Undeniably, 
variables within each interaction can and will influence the next interaction. When a 
perturbation strikes a crowd and individuals begin interacting, there are a variety of 
outcomes from each individual interaction that lead to other outcomes—including 
evacuation and first-aid as observed previously at focus events—but not absolute chaos. 
In fact, the reason crowds do not reach absolute chaos is because at the edge of 
chaos, the crowd, as a CAS, finds a balance between order and flexibility.187 The space 
created between chaos and order is the grey area of chaordic, where the opportunity lies 
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for leaders of the response community to leverage the crowd.188 In this chaordic space, the 
ability of the CAS to adapt to its surroundings is fundamental to its survival.189 Planners 
who adopt a mindset to address the chaordic reality of the crowd as a CAS allow for 
planning that embraces crowd complexity, challenges, and the ensuing opportunities that 
can be leveraged.190 By understanding the natural tendency of the crowd to move toward 
order, the mindset of leadership and planners can optimize the response by rejecting the 
false assumption of complete chaos. Moreover, the responder community can learn from 
this research that crowds cannot be guided using an authoritarian approach to planning and 
response—along a linear path—or there will be unforeseen consequences.191 The challenge 
presented is in identifying what opportunities exist in the chaordic realm and experimenting 
with the options to meet the needs and resource limitations of the individual agencies. 
D. PRIMING 
According to Daniel Molden, priming involves “some stimulation of people’s 
mental representation of social targets, events, or situations that influences subsequent 
evaluations, judgments, or actions.”192 Additionally, the effects of priming are assumed to 
occur outside individual awareness of the potential for influence, or the actual intention to 
use the activated representation in the appropriate moment.193 However, there is no 
consensus on which priming mechanisms, including delivery methods, produce the desired 
effects.194 Research has concluded that priming is a tool to influence an individual in 
specific social contexts to attribute a feeling of inclusion or exclusion.195 The implications 
for desiring inclusion tie directly to SIT and ESIM.  
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Using social order to connect these concepts is a natural fit. Social order is based 
not on biology but on the past activities of man, and is a human product.196 Priming 
individuals to respond to a focus event and having them respond effectively are also the 
products of past activities. Priming places individuals in a position to identify with a 
specific group; presumably, it implies possessing particular attributes and a corresponding 
identity.197 Planners might assume that a primed individual is inclined to participate 
actively during a focus event by using the tools learned from priming to produce a favorable 
group identity—in other words, being a hero—leading to collective action and group 
empowerment as outlined in the ESIM. The expected outcome within the focus event is 
emergence—a leverage point for planners. 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)’s most current edition of NFPA 
3000, the Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) Program, 
acknowledges priming through public education. NFPA 3000 is an effort to encourage 
local jurisdictions to take proactive measures to prime the public with education in such 
areas as survival strategies and actions, medical interventions for injuries caused by trauma, 
intervention equipment needs, and the expectations of emergency responders when they 
arrive.198 The concept of priming is not original to the NFPA. The American College of 
Surgeons’ Committee on Trauma introduced the Stop the Bleed campaign in 2015 as a way 
to prime non-medical, civilian personnel in hemorrhage control with the use of direct 
pressure and tourniquet application skills.199 In a 2018 study to test the efficacy 30 days 
after initial training, 60 percent of subjects were able to recall the training with no refresher, 
and 100 percent could effectively perform hemorrhage control with on-site remediation.200 
Thus, the study suggests a high level of effectiveness in priming for life-saving measures 
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specific to a focus event. Nevertheless, the results indicate further research is needed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of recall in an austere environment like a focus event. 
Priming will create a useful set of skills for individuals to intervene during a focus 
event. Those skills are often limited to the tools and equipment available to the individuals 
in the moment of need. In recognition of this limitation to enabling primed individuals or 
a crowd to perform as trained, Chief Julie Downey of Davie Fire Rescue introduced a new 
city ordinance requiring bleeding-control kits be collocated with automated external 
defibrillators.201 Having the foresight to incorporate the primed public into response 
planning is a model that is achievable if leaders make a concerted and long-term 
commitment to their communities. The more accepted and available the efforts, such as 
Chief Downey’s continuation of Stop the Bleed, the faster these concepts will accelerate. 
Programs that encourage priming will become the de facto standard in our society.202  
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter presented a new framework that considers stress, panic, chaos, and
priming as a way forward. Stress explains the phenomenon of fight-or-flight behavior 
displayed by individuals. The crowd experiencing a focus event will experience both fight 
and flight, so the opportunity lies with planners. The fight group is a point of leverage in 
planning for the response community and should be used as a force multiplier by way of 
impending emergence. The flight group within the focus event crowd is also expected and 
should also be planned for, but as identified in this thesis, the entire crowd is not stressed 
into flight. Because panic and mass panic are not applicable to focus event crowds, officials 
who foster a more honest relationship with the crowd via information do not create panic 
but rather instill credit and confidence in authorities. A somewhat synonymous descriptor 
of a focus event crowd is chaos, but research shows the CAS nature of crowds during a 
focus event lies in the chaordic zone where the crowd never reaches chaos but seeks 
order—historically through emergence. Finally, primed individuals within the crowd are 
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largely responsible for returning order to the focus event, so priming individuals within the 
community and planning for their presence at a focus event is a smart way to prepare for 
such incidents.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has evaluated myriad factors contributing to a crowd’s experience 
during a focus event and the subsequent expectations of crowd behavior for planners and 
the first-response community to consider moving forward, particularly in the first 15 
minutes of the response. The factors covered start with timeworn theories of crowd 
behavior as a background to show why planners and responders have dismissed crowds as 
potential partners in response to focus events. The research identifies a more applicable 
social psychology framework for crowds experiencing a focus event, through the concepts 
of stress, panic, chaos, and priming, to explain the experiences observed in case studies of 
the Boston Marathon bombing and the Las Vegas high-rise shooting. I have identified 
commonalities in crowd behavior and response along with first-responder pre-deployment 
and response through the case studies. The following findings and conclusions lead to 
actionable recommendations in the final portion of this chapter. 
A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Le Bon’s early work, which advocates the need to control crowds because of their 
irrational and impulsive behavior, lack of morality, and mob mentality, still shapes first 
responders’ expectations of crowds, but these generalizations are not applicable to modern 
crowds experiencing a focus event.203 Other misconceptions of such crowds are evident in 
the descriptors used, including panic and chaos. Planners and first responders who assume 
mass panic and chaos will ensue during a focus event consequently lose their ability to 
leverage a crowd experiencing a focus event.  
Panic, as traditionally explained, is fear resulting in a collective flight from a threat 
in the hope of escaping.204 Additionally, Quarantelli and others argue for the removal of 
the panic concept vis-à-vis collective behavior, as the origins of chaos denote a complete 
 
203 Le Bon, A Study of the Popular Mind, 16–17, 28. 
204 Quarantelli, “The Sociology of Panic,” 4–5. 
54 
lack of structure or systematic composition.205 These traditional definitions show how 
planners and the first-responder community discount the crowd as a partner in response 
efforts by ignoring the complexity thereof. The research acknowledges the complexity of 
a crowd and thus identifies a more applicable theory in CAS to be applied to crowd 
behavior during a focus event.  
The key finding and connection between a crowd experiencing a focus event and a 
CAS are their non-linearity. Both the non-linear CAS and the crowd experiencing a focus 
event exhibit a natural adaptation by the system to achieve order. The natural desire of a 
crowd to achieve order keeps it on the threshold of chaos—the chaordic zone—but the 
crowd never crosses over because living systems typically respond to the discordance of 
threats through efforts to reestablish stability.206 Planners and first responders who view a 
focus-event crowd through CAS-colored glasses gain a complexity mindset, resulting in 
an outlook of accepting and accounting for the complexity of the crowd and acknowledging 
that certain factors in crowd behavior cannot be controlled by responders during a focus 
event response.207 Furthermore, by adopting the complexity mindset, planners and 
responders extend their ability to leverage a crowd in the chaordic zone with the 
expectation of impending emergence. 
An individual’s release of adrenal glucocorticoids in response to the stress of a 
focus event is a great contributor to emergence.208 The prosocial behavior of emergence is 
a type of protective response identified in stress research.209 Of additional importance is 
the difference between stressed individuals within a focus-event crowd and the individual 
physiological responses as they seek safety and homeostasis.210 Thus, the leverage point 
for planners and first responders is the essential psychobiological fight-or-flight stress 
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response exhibited by individuals within a focus-event crowd.211 Individuals cope 
differently to stress, which explains why crowd behavior at a focus event is non-linear and 
better evaluated through CAS than the traditional linear mindset of mass panic or chaos. 
Priming as a contributor to the individual responses observed in focus events is a 
beneficial tool for leveraging “immediate responders” within the first 15 minutes of such 
incidents. Furthermore, when priming is positively reenforced, it can contribute to the 
prosocial behavior of emergence that benefits the overall response outcome to a focus 
event, as identified in Boston and Las Vegas. Crowd members who are primed to act 
contribute to the response efforts of a focus event as immediate responders, as proven in 
the case studies. 
The combined lessons from Boston and Las Vegas generate important findings and 
conclusions for the first-response community and future planners. The impetus for this 
thesis is needing to understand crowd behavior in response to a focus event, and a key 
finding is that immediate-responder emergence by the crowd is inevitable. Related to 
crowd emergence are the unintentional distractors created by the crowd, such as intoxicated 
individuals, access issues, and transport delays. Thus, crowd demographics should be 
evaluated as a factor in both crowd emergence and distractors caused by individuals. 
Indeed, the response community can and should pre-plan for crowd emergence and 
distractors, and responders should have the training to manage the individual distractors 
created within and by the crowd in those initial moments after the event. I urge agencies to 
incorporate the noted crowd behaviors from the case studies with appropriate adjustments 
tailored to the responders’ ability to leverage the crowd—through lessons applied.  
By understanding crowds experiencing a focus event as CASs, the responder 
community can better leverage the crowd during its response with more strategically 
pre-deployed resources. As demonstrated in the Boston and Las Vegas case studies, agency 
pre-deployment of resources and established working relationships among the first-
responder community form a common thread in effective responses to focus events. The 
need for a UCC and unified command was recognized in Boston and Las Vegas. A delay 
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in establishing a unified command challenges overall incident response communication 
and resource tracking. This research posits that a pre-established UCC will expedite the 
coordination and deployment of resources including those dedicated to patient care. 
Planners and the first-response community can glean from Boston and Las Vegas the value 
and challenges of pre-deployed EMS resources. Moreover, pre-staged medical resources 
can be quickly overrun with patients, especially if there is an absence of trauma supplies 
for hemorrhage control. Also, a shortage of traditional EMS transport units can result in 
the improvised transportation of patients to medical facilities by civilians and law 
enforcement officers—in some cases, to facilities that do not offer the appropriate level of 
care for the injuries presented. Planners who evaluate the crowd as a CAS and pre-deploy 
resources can integrate the crowd behavior into their plans and prepare for immediate 
responders.  
A final component of pre-deployment of resources to leverage the crowd, as 
identified in the case studies, is ensuring that proper resources such as specialty teams and 
dispatchers are integrated into the response plan. When a focus event occurs, the dispatch 
centers should not be learning of the mass gathering in that moment. They will be less 
effective if they are trying to grasp the situation in real time, as was the case in Las Vegas. 
The use of specialty teams, such as JHATs in Boston, minimizes any potential delays to 
patient treatment due to contamination concerns or the overall response because of 
additional threats. Furthermore, the use of specialty teams to gather real-time facts about 
the focus event will provide the unified command with the information it needs to 
communicate with event promoters, responders, and the crowd. As discussed in Chapter 
IV, information from authorities does not incite panic; information fosters credibility. 
Finally, all agencies that are potentially responsible for the mitigation of a focus event 
should be included in the planning phases of an event to determine the most appropriate 
pre-deployment posture for their respective resources.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Planners and the first-responder community must leave the antiquated negative 
rhetoric about crowd behavior behind. The time for a paradigm shift is now—crowds that 
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experience a focus event can be leveraged to harness the positivity presented in emergence. 
Planners and the first-responder community can adopt the framework presented by 
acknowledging crowds as complex adaptive systems. Crowd stress should precipitate 
emergence—not evoke the discourse of mass panic and ensuing chaos—and thus an 
opportunity to leverage primed individuals, immediate responders, to generate positive 
response outcomes. Public servants are viewed as leaders in the community, particularly 
during a focus event, so people will embody the direction of their leaders and follow their 
leadership, thereby strengthening the prosocial behavior of emergence.212 Non-linear 
thinking and adaptability are needed by planners and first responders to maximize the 
utility of immediate responders, yet planners must not assume the next emergency will 
yield better outcomes because an agency experienced a previous focus event.213 The ability 
to leverage a crowd for a more effective response in the first 15 minutes of a focus event 
starts with actually learning from lessons and adjusting plans. 
The following recommendations are for planners to consider in preparing for a 
mass-gathering event. The first recommendation for planners starts with the complexity 
mindset and requires that agencies reject the assumption that there is a single way to 
prepare for mass gatherings. Planners should prepare responders for emergence: “If 
responders are to improve in responding, they must practice some improvising in their 
preparedness activities.”214 One recommendation to achieve improvisation at a focus event 
is to maintain a supply of hemorrhage control kits at pre-staged medical locations and in 
pre-staged apparatuses to augment the potential need. The hemorrhage control kits should 
be easily distributed and contain enough supplies to treat multiple people per kit. 
Additionally, training non-medical personnel, such as law enforcement, in the use of 
tourniquets can be the force multiplier needed either to physically attend to the large 
number of injured individuals or to direct immediate responders who need a real-time 
refresher or general guidance. Another recommendation for law enforcement officers is to 
familiarize themselves with triage, treatment, and transport, as utilized by the local EMS 
 
212 Van Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, 2:10. 
213 Quarantelli, “Emergent Behaviors and Groups,” 16. 
214 Quarantelli, 16. 
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system. Officers in both case studies were placed in a position to assist with at least one of 
these three components. I propose that pre-staged resources with additional medical 
supplies and training give all responders the ability to pivot and adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment caused by a focus event. Moreover, acknowledging focus-event crowds as 
CASs and the probability of emergence over panic and chaos is crucial.  
Additional recommendations for planners involve collaboration with all internal 
and external partners. Planners should involve dispatch centers in the plan and train 
dispatchers in Incident Command System protocols to minimize the confusion caused by 
a rapidly evolving incident. Whenever possible, dispatchers should be dedicated to the 
incident; otherwise, dispatchers should be prepared to pivot from day-to-day 9-1-1 
operations to those of a mass-casualty incident. Furthermore, specialty resources should be 
involved in the planning process to give resource and pre-deployment recommendations 
based on their expertise, as exhibited in Boston. Regarding external partners, such as the 
ride-share services used extensively in Las Vegas, representatives from the companies 
should be included in the UCC to take advantage of crowd stress.215 A representative could 
be used to direct resources and information in coordination with the command team. The 
last recommendation for planners involves information sharing, particularly with the 
crowd. Local planners ought to distribute the plan to the event promoter and disseminate 
information in as close to real time as possible. A communication plan to leverage 
immediate responders will give the crowd an active and positive role that will not only help 
in the response effort but also move the CAS more quickly to the state of order it already 
seeks.216 Planners should treat all of their partners as capable partners and not exclude 
agencies, resources, or the crowd from their list. 
Immediate responders are most useful if they are primed. Policymakers should 
consider expanding programs like Stop the Bleed in their jurisdictions in a collaborative 
and strategic way. For instance, they ought to establish partnerships with local hospitals, 
 
215 Some stressed individuals in flight mode use ride-share services to flee the scene or self-transport to 
medical care Conversely, stressed individuals in fight mode may assist victims by evacuating wounded and 
using ride-share services to get them to the hospital. In both cases, ride-share services may not take the 
wounded to an appropriate medical facility for the wounds sustained. 
216 Glass and Schoch‐Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People,” 220. 
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fire departments, and EMS transport companies to deliver training to identified community 
demographics in a coordinated effort. The more individuals who are trained, the greater the 
likelihood of having a reliable force multiplier in immediate responders on the scene of a 
focus event. 
The final set of recommendations are in the form of ordinances. As experienced in 
Las Vegas, the local ordinance did not mandate that command-and-control elements be in 
place for the mass-gathering event. Every jurisdiction should evaluate the need for such 
mandates. Moreover, the size of the expected crowd should be worked into a sliding scale 
as a contributing factor in determining the required resources addressed in the mandate. 
Having pre-deployed command staff in communication with resources in the field 
minimizes confusion among resources responding to the focus event and maximizes their 
coordination and effectiveness with the resources already on scene. The final 
recommendation is in recognition of the ordinance put into place by Chief Downey, as 
mentioned in Chapter IV. Communities should take advantage of automated external 
defibrillator locations that people are familiar with and add bleeding-control kits. While 
the focus of this research is on a planned event’s becoming a focus event, the availability 
of bleeding-control kits throughout a jurisdiction can be pivotal in unanticipated 
circumstances and help to develop a primed community. 
C. THE WAY FORWARD 
The studies of crowd behavior during a focus event are extremely limited, so this 
thesis presented a new framework to describe the elements of stress, panic, chaos, and 
priming in focus events. Additionally, the studies on emergence largely center on disasters 
and contain limited accounts of the faster-evolving nature of focus events. The observed 
behaviors of the crowds in the case studies illustrate the applicability of the non-linear 
characteristic of CAS and the new framework for crowds that experience focus events—
both warrant future research. Learning to leverage a crowd in a positive way will assist 
large jurisdictions with considerable resources and smaller jurisdictions with limited 
resources. Planners who have a firm strategy for incorporating immediate responders into 
their plans can assist future research by identifying and explaining where the costs and 
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benefits lie between resources—for example, trained event staff, pre-staged response units, 
or additional hemorrhage control supplies. Furthermore, additional research should 
evaluate the responder community as a CAS with an emphasis on adaptability in the rapidly 
changing environment presented by a focus event.  
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